Labor markets in Japan : how unemployment is minimized / BEBR No.916 by Taira, Koji, 1926-

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
XD - 1
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/labormarketsinja916tair
Y£
FAC Y WORKj
PAPER NO. 916
ut
U.INOIS
Labor Markets in Japan: How Unemployment
Is Minimized
// IS
nd Bus: tion
ifid 5l

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 916
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
December 1982
Labor Markets in Japan: How Unemployment
Is Minimized
Koj i Taira, Professor
Department of Economics

Abstract
The "official" labor force statistics of Japan indicate that even
under worst economic conditions since the Oil Shock of 1973, Japanese
unemployment has rarely risen above 2.5 percent of the labor force.
This paper examines the concepts and techniques of the conventional
monthly labor force survey of Japan that have given rise to these
"official" figures. A once-a-year special labor force survey is used
for recounting unemployed on the basis of criteria and definitions
approximating the US pratices. The results indicate that the US-type
unemployment rates for Japan should be about twice as high as Japan's
"official" rates. In addition, "discouraged workers" are also counted.
Further, this paper clarifies neglected puzzles endemic in the conven-
tional labor force data about differential unemployment rates by sex and
age, concluding that women and middle-aged men are heavily discriminated
against in the labor market.

LABOR MARKETS IN JAPAN: HOW UNEMPLOYMENT IS MINIMIZED
An efficient labor market system presumably minimizes unemployment
when placed under pressure by a reduced aggregate demand or by sectoral
imbalances in demand for labor. If statistics on employment and unem-
ployment are any guide to the assessment of labor market efficiency,
the performance of the Japanese labor market is almost miraculous:
even after the challenge of the unprecedented fall in the. gross na-
tional product under the OPEC shock, Japan's unemployment rates have
been less than 2.5 percent as compared with pre-shock rates around one
percent.
However, different people emphasize different aspects of Japanese
unemployment—the unemployment rate which is only a little over 2 per-
cent most of the time or the doubling of the unemployment rate within
a few years after 1973. If pre-1973 labor economy was in a state of
full employment, one must concede that the doubled unemployment rate
after 1973 would indicate a labor economy less that full employment.
In fact , during much of the 1950s when no one claimed that Japan was
in full employment, the reported unemployment rates were similar to
those of the 1970s: somewhat above 2 percent. Today people readily
discount the problem of unemployment for one good reason; i.e.,
because of the rise in individual incomes and the progress in social
insurances, the same rate of unemployment today means much less human
hardship than before. But if the rate of unemployment indicates the
degree to which an economy's labor force is underutilized, anyone who
remembers the state of labor force underutilization during the 1950s
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would consider the similar unemployment rates of the 1970s alarming.
The mystery of Japanese unemployment has always been why the reported
unemployment figures do not seem to reflect this alarm. This gives
rise to two kinds of inquiry. If one feels that the utilization of
the labor force is low, one may suspect that there is involuntary
underemployment, especially in the form of shorter hours than con-
sidered "full-time." (In the labor force survey, anyone who worked
even an hour on a paid job or as a family worker is counted as
"employed.") In this chapter, we do not intend to investigate this
aspect. Rather, we propose to take up another challenge; i.e., the
reported rates of unemployment may be due in part to ways in which
unemployment is defined and counted in Japan.
In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of possible
inadequacies in the measurement techniques that have produced the low
unemployment rates. The conventional labor force survey, modelled
after the techniques used in the United States, has acquired charac-
teristics that by comparison with the U.S. techniques seemed to
understate the extent of unemployment. The Japanese survey techniques
are simpler than those of the U.S. and almost deliberately brunted, so
to speak, on the edges of questions that should have been sharper for
eliciting answers to serve as the basis for unemployment statistics.
It seems that workers "statistically" move between employment and non-
labor force bypassing unemployment. The U.S. Department of Labor's
International Comparisons of Unemployment (Bulletin 1979) compares
between the U.S. and Japan as to who is included in or excluded from
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unemployed. (The study covers 6 countries including Japan and the
U.S.) Persons on layoff are included in the U.S., but excluded in
Japan. In Japan, they are included in employed as persons with a job
but not at work. Persons waiting to report to a new job at a later
date are included in unemployed in the U.S. but excluded in Japan.
Family workers are included in employed in Japan if they worked even
an hour during the survey week, while in the U.S. they would not be
included unless they worked 15 or more hours. Furthermore, what seems
most important is that the reference period for jobseeking is one
month in the U.S. and either one week or undefined in Japan. Thus,
for international comparison of unemployment rates, the published
figures have to be adjusted by transferring out of employment and the
non-labor force those persons who would have been unemployed by con-
cepts and techniques used in other countries and by eliminating from
reported unemployment those who should not be there by other
countries' criteria. Several studies have concluded that the sta-
tistically hidden unemployment of Japan would double the "official"
unemployment rates—more than four percent instead of about two per-
1
cent.
The Japanese Government responded to the demand for more reliable
statistics on employment and unemployment by initiating a new survey
in March 1977. This is the "Special Survey of the Labor Force Survey"
(Special Labor Force Survey hereinafter) undertaken once a year at the
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end of March. Detailed questions in this survey yields information
which can be used for re-calculating Japan's unemployment rates by
internationally comparable concepts. On the basis of the information
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generated by the conventional labor force survey alone, it is
impossible to detect the unemployed among the jobless who are "not in
the labor force" or "non-employed" (to be defined shortly) among the
reported unemployed. The adjustments that the conventional survey
permits result in trivial differences as demonstrated by the efforts
of the U.S. Department of Labor in the publication mentioned above.
In this chapter we recount Japan's unemployed by a direct use of the
results of the Special Labor Force Survey. First, we look for
unemployed among the employed and those not in the labor force.
Secondly, we look for "non-unemployed" among the unemployed.
(1) In Table 1, we present the results of the Special Labor Force
Survey in the conventional format. In it a few classes of persons
(Table 1 about here)
employed or not in the labor force who should be included in unemployed
are also mentioned. These, when re-classified appropriately, yield
the adjusted labor force in Table 2. The adjustment is in two steps.
(Table 2 about here)
First, only the clearest cases are included in unemployed: those laid
off, those who have temporarily closed down, those having jobs to re-
port to within 30 days and, most importantly, those who looked for
work in March, though they did not during the reference week, and who
were currently (immediately, sugu in Japanese) available for work.
These workers nearly double the unemployment rate. Secondly, other
persons with jobs to report to at dates beyond 30 days and the "dis-
couraged workers" are added to the first adjustment. The "discouraged
workers" are those who did not look for work any time during March in
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the belief Chat they could not find work anv way but who said they
were currently (immediately) available for work, if found. The unem-
ployment rate rises as a result, but surprisingly, does not rise as
much in proportion as it does upon the first adjustment. "Non-
unemployed" subtracted from conventional unemployed, in Table 2 , is a
subject of substantial importance, which is discussed later.
Workers on layoff and self-employed workers temporarily closed down
for economic reasons are "employed" in the category "with a job but not
at work." Their number is very small, however. That these workers are
not included in unemployed is perhaps grounded in Japanese philosophy
of employment. Above all, employment to the Japanese is a relationship
between employer and employee. So long as that relationship is main-
tained even though the employee does not report for work, he is em-
ployed. This philosophy would make American workers on layoff subject
to recall employed, not unemployed. The maintenance of the employment
relationship is so important to the Japanese even where there is noth-
ing to do but wait at home till work becomes necessary that the first
public employment policy in the wake of the post-OPEC recession was
that of subsidizing hard-pressed employers to keep paying their laid-
off employees. This policy made it easier for declining or cyclically
sensitive industries to unload redundant workers with a minimum of so-
cially undesirable side effects, that is, avoiding the impression that
they were throwing unwanted workers out on the street - a traditional
image of unemployment much feared and hated anywhere. Furthermore, by
calling the otherwise unemployed workers employed, statistics help pre-
vent the status deprivation of the jobless. It is also in conformity
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with this line of social philosophy that some of the jobless eligible
for being included in unemployed in other countries are statistically
hidden in the non-labor force in Japan.
Those who have a job to report to at a later date include an impor-
tant group: school leavers and college graduates. By March 31 all
students (barring a small number of failures) have had their proper
graduation ceremonies and earned their diplomas". Long before gradua-
tion, they were interviewing for jobs over several months. At differ-
ent points of time during the pre-graduation jobseeking, the then pro-
spective graduates secured informal agreements ( naitei ) with specified
employers on jobs to report to after graduation. What makes them "un-
employed" on March 31 may be more technical than real. But there are
good reasons, too. They are neither keeping house nor going to school.
They are interested in work and preparing for it. In the United States,
future jobs are not so firm and there always is the possibility that
those who now may think they have a job will find, when the hoped-for
time comes, that the employer has changed his mind. It therefore seems
justified to treat a future job as a present equivalent of joblessness.
In the Japanese case, the informal promises are probably much firmer
than in the U.S. But the cancellation of the promises by the employer
is not unknown. Especially during the post-OPEC adjustment period,
there was a high risk that the promises were not kept. In any case,
the graduates with a job to report to in the future are technically no
different from the jobless who are waiting for the results of past
jobseeking activities, except that the risk of jobs disappearing is
much lower for graduates than for others.
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"Current availability" for work distinguishes jobseekers who are
unenployed from jobseekers who are not included in unemployed . In the
conventional labor force survey of Japan, current availability was as-
sumed for jobseekers, but no independent test was made for the validity
of this assumption. The Special Labor Force Survey makes the issue ex-
plicit. After the question "Do you want work?" put to those who did
not work or look for work during the survey week, the Special Labor
Force Survey asks "Do you intend to work immediately if a job is found?"
(Emphasis supplied). To this, one of the following three answers
should be chosen: "immediately," "not immediately," or "do not know."
Answers to this question can be cross-classified with answers to the
next question: "Why are you not seeking work now [meaning the refer-
ence week] despite your intention to work?" After this, another impor-
tant question is asked: "For the purpose of finding work, have you
during March visited the public employment service, applied for jobs
somewhere, asked your friends to find work for you or done other things
of similar nature?" The answer called for is either "yes" or "no".
Those who answered this question "yes" and who were currently (immedi-
ately) available for work as the result of a previous question can be
considered "unemployed." This leaves out those who looked for work
during March but who did not say that they were immediately available.
Why they should not be considered unemployed is a question of priority
in the structure of judgment: i.e., which is more important or
3
overriding, jobseeking or current availability?
In the U.S. labor force concepts, "temporary illness" is an impor-
tant exception to the current availability rule. Those who meet the
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criteria for being considered unemployed but who are not currently
available because of "temporary illness" are still unemployed. In the
Japanese Special Labor Force Survey, "temporary illness" is introduced
at a different juncture. It is one of the answers to the question
mentioned above— "Why are you not looking for work...? What is impor-
tant is that temporary illness is a reason for not looking for work
during the reference week . Thus, there are those who looked for work
during other weeks of March, although they were unable to look for
work during the reference week because of temporary illness. This
means that those who looked for work during March and are currently
available (and so should be considered "unemployed") include some of
those who were unable to look for work during the reference week
because of temporary illness. In Japan, therefore, temporary illness
is not an exception to the current availability rule. This is shown
in a cross-tabulation of answers to the question whether or not the
persons concerned looked for work during March (worded in a different
form as mentioned earlier) and answers to the question why they did
not look for work during the reference week.
Adjusted unemployment (A.) in Table 2 is the closest approximation
one can make to the coverage of unemployed used in the United States.
A minor exception still left out has to do with the persons employed
in the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, who are included in employed. In
the United States, members of the armed forces are excluded from the
labor force. The U.S. labor force is "civilian." But, the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces are entirely voluntary and compete with other em-
ployers, public and private, for maintaining their manpower level.
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These characteristics of the Japanese "military" forces probably
caution against excluding them from the labor force. In any case, the
exclusion of the 250,000 "military" does not affect the unemployment
rates at all when rounded to the tenths of a percent. Thus, from the
standpoint of comparability in concepts and coverage, the results of
adjustment (A) may bear comparison with the usual unemployment rates
of the United States noted at the bottom of Table 2. The U.S. rates
are still higher than the Japanese, but the difference is much smaller
than that between the U.S. rates and the conventional Japanese rates.
Persons not in the labor force who do not look for work believing
that they cannot find work because of the "discouraging" economic con-
ditions are "discouraged" workers. According to Table 1, there are
large numbers of them, easily surpassing the conventional ranks of un-
employed. But those who are "currently available" for work among them
are fewer. Thus, a large bulk of them do not seem to be seriously
interested in working. If they do not intend to work, it seems clear
that they have decided to withdraw from the labor force or not to par-
ticipate in the labor force yet. Adjustment (B) also includes jobless
who are not looking for work because they have jobs to report to after
one month and jobless who are not currently available but have looked
for work during March. Interestingly, this expansion of the concept
of unemployment does not wildly raise the unemployment rates beyond
the earlier, more orthodox, adjustment. Only by stretching the con-
cept of unemployment in this way, Japanese unemployment rates become
comparable to U.S.
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The Special Labor Force Survey has generated much more information
on attitude toward work that indicates different types and degrees of
interest in work. These attitudinal dimensions require expertise in
Japanese social psychology for proper ordering and interpretation. For
example, the "yes" answer to "do you want work?" can be either "yes,
any kind of work" or "yes, if terms are right." When these different
yeses are cross-tabulated with information on "current (immediate)
availability for work," it is a good question whether the reservation
implied in "yes, if terms are right" may not overshadow "current
availability" and actually turn it into "not currently available."
Here one suffers from an embarras de richesse of information. Why
people are discouraged from lookng for work is also related to several
situations such as local labor markets, seasons, business cycles, etc.
It is again a good question whether a person who does not look for
work believing that there is no job in the local labor market is just
as "discouraged" as a person who does not look for work believing that
the season is bad for jobseeking. These different perceptions and
attitudes await further analysis. In our adjustments for alternative
levels of unemployment, we ignored these different shades of "yes" and
different kinds of "discouragement."
(2) We have so far been concerned with people who are not con-
sidered "unemployed" in Japan but should be so considered by inter-
national standards. Another question worth asking is whether those
considered "unemployed" in Japan are so considered in other countries.
An article by a Labor Ministry official of Japan points out that
Japanese unemployment includes those who would not be considered
-11-
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unemployed by U.S. criteria. We now recount unemployed, taking this
view into account.
The questionnaire used for the Special Labor Force Survey asks
"Did you do any work at all during the last week of March?" This
divides the respondents broadly into those who worked even an hour and
those who "did not work at all during the survey week" (emphasis
supplied) . The latter responses are then classified into (1) tem-
porary absence from work, (2) seeking a job, (3) keeping house or
going to school, and (4) other. "Seeking a job" is defined to refer
to "among persons without jobs who did not work at all during the sur-
vey week, persons currently available for work and [who] are making
specific efforts to find a job or waiting for the results of [past]
jobseeking activity." Those who marked "seeking a job" subject to
this definition are considered "unemployed." The bone of contention is
what to do with those who are classified as "jobseekers" under this
definition, but who obviously did not seek a job during the survey
week but were waiting for the results of past jobseeking.
In the Special Labor Force Survey, "jobseekers" as defined in the
peculiar way mentioned above are asked a number of questions. The
first question is "what kind of methods are you taking for seeking a
job?" Six possible answers are provided for and the respondent is asked
to circle any number of them and to put a double circle on the prin-
cipal method. A sub-question attached to this question asks "when did
you do the last request or application?" (emphasis supplied). Three
choices are offered: (1) during the last week of March (survey week),
(2) during March, and (3) during February or earlier. It is reported,
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for example, for 1980 that more than 40 percent of the "jobseekers"
chose the "February or earlier" answer to the question on the timing
of the "last request or application." The Labor Ministry article
points out that these would be considered "out of the labor force" in
other countries and that Japan's conventional unemployment should be
reduced to that extent in the interest of better comparability.
Obviously, the author of this article believes that those who made
their "last request or application" in February or earlier did not
look for work during March. However, the main question to which this
question on timing is attached enumerates jobseeking methods which
include those different from "request or application;" e.g.,
"collecting wanted ads, or consulting with acquaintances," "preparing
to start a business by procuring funds and materials," and "other."
This means that those who made their "last request or application" in
February or earlier could still be actively seeking work during the
survey week or during March by "collecting wanted ads, or consulting
with acquaintances," "preparing to start a business" (which cannot be
neglected in a country like Japan, where employment on one's own
account is fairly extensive) or in "other" ways.
Thus, the cross-tabulation of answers to the question on job-
seeking methods and answers to the question on the timing of some of
those methods like making a request or application must be read care-
fully. For example, if those who answered the question on jobseeking
methods by saying that they applied for a job at the Public Employment
Office also answered the sub-question on the timing of their "last
request or application " by saying that they made it in February or
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earlier, it may be legitimate to suspect that (provided no other
answers were given to the question on jobseeking methods) these per-
sons may not have done anything during March except for waiting for
the result of their last application . Although they were not looking
for wor during March or the survey week, they considered themselves
as jobseekers because the definition of jobseeking in the Japanese
labor force survey includes "waiting" without seeking. To say
that one is doing something without doing it sounds devastatingly
inconsistent. But the fact that one can actually say so by defining
"doing" as inclusive of "not doing" is one of the flexible properties
of the Japanese language. In English, one's prerogative to define
something cannot be extended to the inclusion of its opposites in the
definition. But English allows a similar practice by the stipulation
of "exceptions." Thus, in the labor force survey of the United
States, while jobseeking is a prime test of unemployment, there are
people who are not seeking a job but still considered unemployed (as
exceptions to the jobseeking rule). They are: "(1) persons waiting to
start a new job within 30 days, and (2) workers waiting to be recalled
from layoff" (emphasis added) . The first group of persons also
exists in the Japanese labor force statistics and already was moved
from "not in the labor force" to unemployment in the preceding sec-
tion. The second group cannot be identified in Japanese statistics.
What is interesting is that in the U.S. exceptions to the job-
seeking rule for unemployment, the key word is "waiting." It is of
course not clear whether "waiting" in the Japanese definition of
unemployment was inspired by the American "waiting exceptions" to the
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jobseeking rule. Since "jobseeking" including "waiting" has been in
practice ever since the beginning of the labor force survey in postwar
Japan, the conceptualization of unemployment including "waiting" must
have had valid reasons, although at the moment we cannot offer a
historical verification of this speculation. The Japanese use of
"waiting" occurs with respect to the results of past jobseeking activi-
ties. The unemployed who fall under this category may have been
"waiting" to be notified by their agencies or prospective employers.
Under certain circumstances, this type of waiting can be the result of
favorable impressions about the chances for landing a job at the time
of request or application. When waiting is as specific as this
example, it is almost like waiting to be called in for work and comes
very close to the American concept of waiting as an exception of the
jobseeking rule for unemployment.
How long one should "wait" in order to be counted as unemployed
rather than "out of the labor force" is also important. In the case
of a job to report to, the waiting period is 30 days in the U.S. But
even in the U.S., there is no specific limitation on the waiting
period for a recall from layoff. In the like manner, the Japanese
idea of open-ended waiting for the results of jobseeking may be defen-
sible. In Japan, it is well-known that in any area of life, more
generous time is customarily allowed for responses to a request than in
other countries. From this point of view, the Labor Ministry
article's exclusion from unemployed of the jobless waiting for the
results of their "last request or application" made in February or
earlier seems unusually strict.
-15-
The structure and wording of the Japanese labor force question-
naire are unfortunately too ambiguous to oer-nit clearcut adjustment
with respect to genuine waiting for the results of past jobseeking.
The Labor 'linistry article restricts "waiting" during the survey week
(the last week of March) to the results of jobseeking between March 1
and the survey week. But if the reference period for jobseeking is
expanded to one month from the conventional one week, anyone who
looked for work during March regardless of whether or not during the
last week of March they were waiting for the results of those activi-
ties would be qualified for being included in unemployed. Thus,
waiting becomes a non-operative concept in this case. It is also a
<jood question whether the expansion of the reference period for job-
seeking to one month inevitably nullifies the need for the concept of
waiting for the results of past jobseeking activities. The use of
waiting in the American labor force concepts seems to suggest that
there may also be room for it in Japanese measurement of the labor
force.
The cross tabulations of the answers to the question on jobseeking
methods and the answers to the sub-question on the "last request or
application" suggest some way out of this murky issue. Table 3 pre-
sents an excerpt from these cross-tabulations with special reference
to the "February or earlier" answers. The first three items refer to
(Table 3 about here)
persons whose "principal" methods of jobseeking involved some kind of
request or application and who said that they made their "last request
or application" in February or earlier. From this, although we feel
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rather uneasy in doing so, one may doubt that these persons were
seeking a job seriously during March. The original data in the books
suggest that some of those (Item 1) who used application at the Public
Employment Office as their "principal" jobseeking method also resorted
to "secondary" methods which did not involve "renuest or application."
This brunts the factoring-out process, but we disregard it for now and
assume that they fail the 30-day jobseeking test. Thus they can be
excluded from unemployed as "non-unemployed." On the other hand, Item
4 in Table 3 only says that those jobseekers whose principal methods
during the survey week were studying wanted ads or checking with
friends made their "last request or application" in February or
earlier when their jobseeking methods may have involved "request or
application." The fact that they made their "last request or
application" in February or earlier in no way discredit their status
as jobseekers during the survey week, since they were then using dif-
ferent methods of jobseeking. Therefore, they are counted as
unemployed. By similar reasoning, Item 5 and 6 are also counted as
unemployed. The conventional unemployed and the deductible "non-
unemployed" are also shown in Tables 1 and 2 above.
Now that the method of recounting Japanese unemployed has been
fully explained, a variety of unemployment rates by sex are presented
in Table 3 in a summary form without enumerating the items subjected
to adjustment. A couple of points are worth pointing out. The
(Table 4 about here)
conventional unemployment rates tend to be lower for women than for
men, but this tendency is reversed after adjustment. For example, in
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1977, the male and female unemployment rates are respectively 2.44 and
2.26 percent. T7hen adjusted, the male and female unemployment rates
rise to 2.95 and 6.25 percent respectively, the latter substantially
higher than the former. When "discouraged workers" are counted, the
female unemployment rates rise more sharply than male (3.63 percent
male against 14.81 percent female). Knowledgeable persons have long
wondered about the lower reported unemployment rates for women than
for men in Japan, a fact that appears rather peculiar in view of the
widely observed tendency that women usually suffer from higher
unemployment rates than men (see U.S. figures in Table 4). But the
expansion of the job search period to one month and other adjustments
make Japanese female unemployment rates higher than male. This
suggests that the labor market disadvantages of women relative to men
are at least similar in nature between Japan and other countries. The
failure of the conventional unemployment rates to reflect this univer-
sal tendency is another reason to suspect the deficiencies of the con-
ventional labor force survey.
Quantitatively, the male-female differentials in unemployment
rates are much greater in Japan than in the United States. In Japan,
then, the brunt of unemployment is borne disproportionately by women.
In other countries, this would be considered substantial evidence of
labor market discrimination against women, though in Japan there is no
active concept of discrimination in this sense—men and women simply
accept their different roles in society and make no fuss about it. In
view of Adjustment (A) , which represents the closest approximation to
the American concept of unemployment, it is interesting to note that
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Japanese women have attained the white American unemployment rates.
If we count "discouraged" women workers (Adjustment S) , Japanese
women's unemployment rises to the Black American level. Why women's
unemployment rates tand to be lower than men's in the official data
owes much to the structure of questions in the survey questionnaire.
Although the unemployment rate based on the labor force survey is
the "face" of Japan proudly turned to the rest of the world, very few
in Japan take the labor force survey seriously. It is viewed as based
on alien concepts of work that the ordinary Japanese find hard to
understand. (Precisely for this reason, a good showing by this con-
cept is something to boast to foreigners.) Thus, the Japanese govern-
ment conducts another employment survey every three years based on
more popular concepts; i.e.
,
"Basic Employment Structure Survey" by
the Prime Minister's Office. In this survey, a person who is 15 years
or older is either "usually employed" (for pay or on own account) or
"usually not-employed." By definition, no one can be "usually
unemployed." However, the persons "usually not-employed" are asked a
number of questions about their interest in employment. Thus, they
can be classified into those interested in work and those not
interested. The interested persons are also asked whether they are
looking (or have looked) for work." Those looking for work are then
asked if they are immediately available for work if work is found.
From all this, one can say that the persons "usually not-employed" who
are interested in work, looking for work, and can start working if
work is found can be considered "unemployed."
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Naohiro Yashiro estimates "unemployment rates" for men and women
from the Employment Structure Survey of 1977. He first identifies
persons "usually not employed" who are interested in work and have
looked or are looking for work as a percentage of the sura of these
persons and those "usually employed." This yields of 3.2 and 12.9
percent "unemployment rates" for men and women. But when the current
availability condition is added, the male and female "unemployment
rates" come down to 2.0 and 6.34 respectively. The male unemployment
rate from the Employment Structure Survey is quite similar to that
from the conventional labor force survey, but the female unemployment
rate here is much larger.
Although no one can be "usually unemployed" (because they would
sooner or later drop out of the labor force) , Japanese concepts
underlying the Basic Employment Structure Survey may permit a general-
ization that the "usual unemployment rates" of Japanese men and women
are 2 and 6.3 percent respectively, averaging at 3.7 percent.
Although this certainly would not strike anyone as extraordinarily
high, it at least suggests that Japan's "true" unemployment may be
higher than what some Japanese would like to advertise to the rest of
the world on the basis of the labor force survey. It also indicates
that Japan's unemployment problem is largely women's problem. In
Japan, however, the phenomenon of male-female differentials in
employment opportunity has not yet arrived on the agenda for serious
Q
discussion. It is also commonly admitted by men and women alike that
Japanese women, if discriminated against in the labor market, enjoy
compensating advantages in other areas of life; e.g., the family and
-20-
household where the woman-wife-mother is said to be an unchallenged
ruler for whom the man-husband-father is little more than a "working
bee" ( hataraki bachi , which can also be humorously rendered into
"punishment at hard labor").
Besides sex, another personal factor that produces differential
labor market advantages among different persons is age. In Japan,
there is a greater willingness to admit the existence of age discrimi-
nation, which is partially indicated by differentially higher
unemployment rates among older persons. Table 5 shows male
unemployment rates by age groups. These are "official" or conven-
tional rates. As our recounting previously showed, the adjusted
(Table 5 about here)
unemployment figures for men are not greatly different from the con-
ventional ones. For example, in Table 4, we see men's unemployment
rises from conventional 2.44 percent to adjusted 2.95 percent for
1977, while women's rises markedly from conventional 2.26 percent to
adjusted 6.25 percent. The modest difference between men's conven-
tional and adjusted unemployment rates enable us to make use of the
readily available "official" disaggregation of men's unemployment by
age as shown in Table 5, reasonably confident that the broad charac-
teristics would not change much after adjustment.
It is generally observed anywhere that the unemployment rates
among young workers are higher than the national average. Japan
should be an exception if the much touted lifetime employment hypo-
thesis were true, because life employment as usually described gives
young men no time to be unemployed by scouting them out of school and
keeping them "for life." Amazingly, Table 5 implies that young men
are vulnerable to fairly high unemployment at entry into the labor
force or in the course of job changes. Japanese men obviously begin
to settle down with long terra jobs at around age 30 and stay with them
until their 50s. Then unemployment rises among middle-aged men to
rates far above the national average. The middle-age bulge in
unemployment rates is widely regarded extraordinary by international
9
standards. It reflects the uniquely Japanese practice of discrimina-
tion against aging workers as represented by the institution of teinen
which means termination of employment for reasons of age. The pre-
vailing teinen age in Japanese firms was 55 until recently. The pro-
portion of firms using 60 as teinen has since increased. At the same
time, firms are increasingly encouraging their employees to retire
(quit) early. Thus the "formal" extension of teinen obviously
encourages management to find ways to bypass the formal rules. The
net effect is that Japan fails to offer job security to workers 55
years or older. Although similarly high unemployment rates among
young men below 30 are due in large part to new entries into the labor
force and voluntary job changes, the unemployment of older workers is
due more to involuntary job terminations and subsequent difficulties
in finding new jobs.
Aging also affects earnings inversely. Men's regular base pay
reaches its peak on the average in the age bracket of 45-49 and
decreases to about 70 percent of the peak by 60-64 years (according to
wage statistics for 1979) . Since it is during this life stage that
unemployment among men is seen to rise, it appears that sharper
-22-
decreases in wages are needed for preventing unemployment of the
middle-aged from rising or that in case continued regular employment
until 65 is desired, earlier pay raises (before age 45) have to be
moderated so that wages may be kept from falling in later years
(45-65). This requires a new view of lifetime earnings profile
distinctly different from the current profile. Since the system of
pay increases linked with the length of service (the So-called nenko
wage system) was originally fashioned with the teinen of 55 in mind,
employers have for some time argued that the raising of the teinen
age would require a new earnings profile over the new, longer period
of employment if earnings were to continue to rise till the time of
teinen . This argument implies that younger men below age 50 would be
worse off under the system of revised teinen than at present. Thus, a
conflict of interest between generations is a powerful constraint on
the revision of teinen .
In addition to open unemployment, the possibility of labor redun-
dancies in Japanese firms was also a popular topic in the late 1970s.
Several well-known banks and research institutes announced their esti-
mates of labor redundancies in the Japanese economy. A few examples
were picked up by the Ministry of Labor and published in its Labor
White Paper (1978). Labor redundancy is defined as the excess of
actual employment over optimal employment which is estimated from the
level of output and labor productivity. Various formulae with dif-
ferent degrees of sophistication are employed for the purpose. The
estimated full-time-equivalent redundancies for 1977 as percentages of
-23-
the labor force range from a low of 4.4 percent to a high of 7.2 per-
cent. Since the "official" unemployment rate for 1977 was a little
over 2 percent (our adjusted rate was somewhat above 4 percent), the
Japanese economy was, obviously holding a surprising amount of excess
labor at the expense of productivity, although workers' apparent
willingness to forego wage increase or even to take wage cuts helped
employers reduce the costs of labor redundancies.
To summarize, the underutilization of Japan's labor force after
1973 has been extensive. One might roundly put it at 10 percent or so
for the late 1970s. But this was shared 6 to 4 between redundant
employment and open unemployment. The deficiencies of the conven-
tional labor force survey also have helped soften the shock of dis-
covery of the worsened labor market conditions by understating the
extent of open unemployment. If the "true" unemployment rates can be
said to be double the official rates, Japan's unemployment of the late
1970s was roughly comparable to Western Europe's, though somewhat
lower than America's. Even so, the fact that the excess labor
amounting to 10 percent of the labor force produced an open
unemployment rate of 4 percent is an interesting economic phenomenon.
As demonstrated elsewhere, large enterprises unloaded their redundant
labor rather efficiently, and labor absorption occurred in smaller
firms and in the service sector. The factor that made this possible
was the collapse of worker militancy and the moderation of real wage
increases. There even was a decrease in average real wages in 1980.
Workers were cowed by a great fear of joblessness, it seems. In other
words, high open unemployment was avoided by the willingness to
-24-
chastened workers to take any jobs for any wages. All this of course
indicates that Japanese labor markets worked with remarkable effi-
ciency.
-25-
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Table 1. The Labor Force of Japan, 1977-1980 (in thousands of persons)
1977 1978 1979 1980
Working—age population, total
Labor force, total
Employed, total
of whom persons with a job,
but not at work
including those laid off or
closed down
for less than one month
for more than one month
family workers working fewer
than 15 hours a week
Unemployed
"non-unemployed"
85,870 86,790 87,790 88,480
53,430 54,240 54,770 55,370
52,160 52,830 53,420 54,130
1,340 1,760
100
60
40
400
1,270
330
140
60
80
580
1,410
420
1,390
140
60
80
490
1,350
370
940
NA
2
NA
NA
760
1,240
310
Not in the labor force, total
o f whom
,
have a job to report to
within one month;
after one month
32,190 32,250 32,800 33,110
830 830 840 860
740 730 740 740
100 100 100 120
looked for work during March
currently available
for work;
not currently available
1,060
510
550
1,080 1,090
560
520
490
600
960
430
530
did not look for work during
March
think cannot find work,
of whom currently available
for work
6,520
1,850
490
7,910
2,220
610
8,260
2,220
610
1,470
1,880
560
Sources : The Prime Minister's Office, Bureau of Statistics, Kodoryoku
chosa tokubetsu chosa hokoku (Report on the Special Survey
of the Labour Force Survey), each year, 1977-80.
All numbers here are rounded to the nearest 10,000 (Japanese unit:
man) . Rounding errors exist at this level.
'Not available.
Table 2. The Adjusted Labor Force and its Components, 1977-1980
(in thousands of persons).
1977 1978 1979 1980
I. Labor force, adjusted (A)
Employed , conventional
less layoff, closed down
family workers working
fewer than 15 hours a week
Employed, adjusted (A)
Unemployed, adjusted (A)
Unemployed, conventional
less "non-unemployed"
layoff, closed down
have a job to report to
within one month
Looked for work during
March and currently
available for work
II. Labor force, adjusted (B)
Employed (A)
Unemployed, adjusted
Unemployed (A)
Have a job after one
month
Looked for work during March,
but not currently available
"Discouraged" currently
available for work
III. Unemployment rates (in percent)
Conventional
Adjusted (A)
Adjusted (B)
Compare : U.S. rates
53,950 54,530 55,140 55,490
52,160 52,830 53,420 54,130
100 - 140 - 140 NA
400 -580 - 490 - 760
51,660 52,110 52,790 53,390
2,290 2,420 2,350 2,100
1,270 1 ,410 1 ,350 1,240
330 - 420 - 370 310
100 140 140 NA
740 730 740 740
510 560 490 430
55,090 55 ,760 56 ,450 56,630
51,660 52 ,110 52 ,790 53,370
3,430 3 ,650 3 ,660 3,310
2,290 2 ,420 2 ,350 2,100
100 100 100 120
550 520 600 530
490 610 610 560
2.38 2.60 2.46 2.24
4.24 4.44 4.26 3.79
6.23 6.54 6.48 5.84
7.1 6.1 5.8 7.1
Sources: Same as Table 1.
""Conventional" means the labor force concepts of Table 1.
'Economists' designation of those not in the labor force who do not look
for work because they do not think they can find work. See Table 1.
Table 3. Distribution of jobseekers who raade their "last request or
application" in February or earlier, by principal jobseeking
methods during the last week of March, 1977-1980 (in
thousands of persons)
1977 1978 1979 1980
"Totally unemployed", total 1,270 1,410 1,350 1,240
Unemployed who made "last
request or application"
in February or earlier 520 640 600 540
Principal jobseeking methods
during the survey week:
1. Application of Public
Employment Office 180 230 210 150
2. Application at prospective
employers 10 50 40 40
3. Request with schools or
acquaintances 140 140 120 120
4. Studying want ads, or
consulting with aquaintances 140 160 190 170
5. Preparing to start a
business
6. Other
"Non-unemployed" (1+2+3)
Net "totally unemployed"
Sources: The Special Labor Force Survey.
10 30 20 10
40 30 — 30
330 420 370 310
940 990 980 930
Table 4. Unemployment rates by sex, 1977-1980
1977 1978 1979 1980
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Conventional 2.44 2.26 2.74 2.44 2.50 2.40 2.19 2.32
Adjusted (A) 2.95 6.25 3.34 6.24 3.01 8.65 2.75 5.20
Adjusted («) 3.63 14.81 4.00 10.49 5.18 13.03 3.48 9.21
Compare :
U.S., white 5.5 7.3 4.6 6.2 4.5 5.9 6.1 6.5
U.S., black and
other 12.3 13.9 11.0 13.0 10.4 12.3 13.2 13.1
Sources : The Special Labor Force Survey .
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